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1. Introduction
What is the relationship between argumentation and inference? Let me begin by saying a
few things about what got me started on this topic. I first set upon this topic because I saw it a as
fundamental issue lurking at the basis of the tension, if not outright rift, between process- and
product-based theories of argument (O’Keefe 1977, Brockriede 1977, Wenzel 1980). I felt that,
by examining the relationship of inference to argument, we, as theorists, might clarify the
relationship, and resolve some of the tensions, between these competing models of argument.
Having set upon this topic, I was encouraged to see that Ralph Johnson, in his recent
Manifest Rationality (2000), numbered the question of the relation between argument and
inference among those fundamental theoretical questions to be addressed by any theory of
argument (39, 37-41). (This gave me a kind of re-assurance that I was on to something with this
topic.) Somewhat later, I became dismayed upon finding that Johnson’s colleague, Pinto, had
already written on precisely this topic (1995a, 1995b). (Great, I thought, my topic has “been
done” already.) Then, I discovered that the two did not agree in their views about inference and
argumentation. (Back in business! I thought.) And, with a bit more investigation, I thought that I
might even have something new to add on this issue.
2. Argumentation Theory: Two Projects & Two Questions
With Johnson, I see two basic tasks for Argumentation Theory: one is descriptive and
analytic; the other is normative or critical and evaluative (Godden, 1999). With Johnson, I will
call these the Theory of Analysis and the Theory of Appraisal respectively. These two aspects of
Argumentation Theory raise at least two prima facie theoretical issues. The first concerns the
Theory of Appraisal, and is the Foundational Question [FQ]: What are the standards that inform
the norms of argument? That is, what will our norms be based upon? (We will get back to this
question a bit later.) The second question, and the one with which I shall start today is: How is
the relationship between those norms and the subject matter of Argumentation Theory secured?
For lack of a better name, I will simply call this the Connection Question [CQ].
To put the Connection Question a bit more clearly, let me observe a tension created by the
two central projects of Argumentation Theory. Whatever we take to be the proper subject matter
of Argumentation Theory, I take it that we mean for it to be directly relevant both descriptively
and normatively, to what Harman (1986) has called “reasoned change in view.”1 So, for
instance, classically rhetorical (process-based) theories take as their subject matter those
1

Importantly, Harman identified argument with proof that is governed by the rules of implication, and
contrasted this with reasoned change in view which is governed by rules of revision which he specifically calls rules
of “inference” (3). Then, considering modus ponens Harman continues: “Such a rule [of implication] by itself says
nothing at all in particular about belief revision. It may be that some principles of belief revisions refer to such
principles of argument, that is, to principles of implication” (ibid).
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communications whose aim is to gain or increase the adherence of an audience to a thesis
(Tindale, 70). Similarly, Johnson takes (the product-based) informal-logic to study
“argumentation in everyday discourse” (Johnson, 119) or argument seen as “discourse directed
toward rational persuasion,” (Johnson, 150) where rational persuasion is taken to mean “that the
arguer wishes to persuade the Other to accept the conclusion on the basis of the reasons and
considerations cited [in the argument] and those alone” (ibid; emphasis added). In each case, the
subject of study is that which brings about, effects, or is responsible for, a change in view. Thus,
on the one hand, the subject matter of the Theory of Analysis is reasoning as it is used in actual
argument. On the other hand, the Theory of Appraisal is to be used to guide an arguer in coming
to new or changed beliefs,2 and to evaluate their reasoning in doing so. Yet, while the first
project is, it would seem, psychological and empirical the second is epistemological and
normative. Now, the Connection Question is: Is the subject matter of the first project the same
as that of the second project? Further: If it is the same, how is the theorist to resolve the tension
between the normative and the psychological dimensions of Argumentation Theory. On the other
hand: If the subject matter is not the same, then how is the evaluative project relevant to the
descriptive one? I take these questions to mark the locus of one of the debates between productand process-based theorists.
3. Inference
So, with this tension in mind, I think that we can now turn to the traditional picture of
inference to see some of the work that it has done within Argumentation Theory. Specifically, I
would like to observe the work that inference does in providing a link between the theory of
Analysis and the Theory of Appraisal. Some theorists have defined inference more or less
closely to argumentation. Pinto (1995a), for instance, defines argument as an invitation to
inference, while other theorists (e.g., Johnson, 2000) want to break this traditional picture of
argument as a series of premises linked by an inference (or a series of successive inferences) to a
conclusion. Before considering these differences, let us try to get a sense of the “Premise +
Inference” (Johnson, 2000) picture of argument, by seeing what it affords the theorist. In this
way, I hope to gain some insight into a number of theoretical issues that any theory of argument
must address.
What, then, do we mean by inference? What is the traditional picture? The traditional
picture provides that inference has a dual-nature. In the first place, inference is a mental act.
Thus, Pinto uses the word ‘inference’ “for the mental act or event in which a person draws a
conclusion from premises, or arrives at a conclusion on the basis of the consideration of a body
of evidence” (1995a, 271; emphasis added). Similarly, Johnson introduces the term “inference”
to mean “a movement (of the mind) from one item (usually a thought) to another, where the
former serves as the basis for and leads to the later” (24; emphasis added). But, inference is not
just any kind of mental act; note the use of the phrase “on the basis of” (or “as the basis for”) in
the two definitions. This phrase precisely echoes Johnson’s extrapolation of the meaning of

2

Admittedly, the result of a “change in view” on Harman’s account, need not be a change in belief; it could be
a change in plan, intentional behaviour, and the like. (See also Pinto, 1995a, 280.) I focus on belief for the time
being for reasons that will become evident.
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“rational persuasion” as the key element of his definition of “argument” (above). As Pinto
observes, then, the meaning of “on the basis of” becomes a crucial consideration (1995a, 279).
First, consider what is afforded to a theory of argument by the mentalistic aspects of this
picture of inference. Since inferences are inherently mental acts, inferential relations are taken to
have a psychological character. Specifically, it is part of the nature of inference to inherently
provide the actual reasons on the basis of which we (rightly or wrongly) come to a reasoned
change in view. So, we can study reasoned change in view by studying inference; at least part
of the subject matter of Argumentation Theory is inference. Further, the question of what
normative theory to supply in the Theory of Argument Appraisal is also significantly answered.
The theory of good argument will significantly include the norms of good inference.3 In fact, I
suggest that this is one of the crucial factors influencing Pinto’s move to define argument in
terms of inference. And it is a feature shared by both Johnson’s and Pinto’s conception of
argument. Both Johnson and Pinto want our Theory of Argument Analysis to study those reasons
on the basis of which we accept a conclusion. Johnson accomplishes this defining argument in
terms of rational persuasion, Pinto by defining argument4 in terms of inference. But, Pinto s
question remains, what do we mean by “on the basis of”?
One attempt to provide some theoretical content to the phrase “on the basis of” has been to
suggest that an inference is not just any act of the mind. Rather, inference is a kind of reasoning,
like calculation. That is, inference is a rule-governed act of the mind, and it is on the basis of this
rule that we move to the conclusion (of the inference). Thus, Johnson adds to his definition of
inference, saying that inference is “the transition of the mind from one proposition to another in
accordance with some principle” (94, cf. 98). This stipulation, I suggest, is neither adequate nor
sufficient to capture what we mean by inference. Not just any rule will do. For instance, one
might supply the Empiricist’s Law of Association as articulated by James Mill in The Analysis of
the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829), which he states as follows: “Our ideas spring up, or
exist, in the order in which the sensations existed, of which they are the copies” (78).
Admittedly, Mill’s Law captures the important idea that inferential relations have, in some sense,
a psychological character. While there are specific corollaries to this Law, the important thing is
that, it is by means of the Law of Association that Mill hopes to account for not only all learning,
but also of all relations of evidence and inference.
Pinto, considering a similar account offered by Armstrong, observes that such causal
account will not do (1995a, 279). That is, on the causal account as I have stated it thus far, every
cognitive act would be an inference, since every cognitive act can be accounted for by the Law
of Association. Yet, whatever we mean by “inference”, it is certainly meant to distinguish the
mere succession of thoughts from those acts of the mind whereby we attain (new) knowledge, or
knowledge on the basis of some systematic (or systematizeable), rule-governed mental operation.
So, we need to find a principled way of distinguishing inferences from other cognitive acts;

3

I have hesitated here to say that a theory of inference would provide a comprehensive theory of argument,
because it would remain to be shown that inferences were the only way by which we came to a (justifiable) change
in view.
4

More fully, Pinto defines ‘argument’ as “sequences of propositions only when they serve as instruments of
persuasion” (1995a, 276), where “the typical goal of an argument is to effect an inference in the person to whom it is
addressed (and not simply to effect acceptance of its conclusion)” (ibid).
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something about the rules of inference will have to distinguish the particularly evidentiary
relationship that obtains between premises and conclusions from those other mental acts, e.g. the
mere succession of thoughts. Further, even if such a distinction can be provided, we will have to
revisit the Foundational Question to determine whether the nature of an evidentiary relationship
can be captured in the terms of the specifically psychological inferential relations we have
already observed.
In addition to being laws of thought, in a certain sense, rules of inference must capture rules
of evidence or rules of justification. This captures the second element of the dual nature of
inference. It is on the basis of not only psychological relations but evidentiary ones that
inferences move us from premises to conclusions. Not only are inferential relations inherently
mental (in fact, inherently causal), they are inherently evidentiary (and thus, inherently
normative).
Pinto considers a modification to this causal view offered by Peirce in “The Fixation of
Belief,” according to which, “That which determines us, from given premises, to draw one
inference rather than another is some habit of mind, whether it is constitutional or acquired”
(Pinto, 1995a, 279, citing Peirce). While Pinto thinks that “there is something importantly rightheaded in this theory of inference” (1995a, 279), he objects to the “habit of mind” theory for six
reasons.5 Most of Pinto’s objections seem to be rooted in the basic objection that Peirce’s “habit
of mind” theory is not comprehensive. It cannot account for many (justifiable) occurrences of
reasoned change in view (objections 1-3 and 5), and it ignores relevant, specifically contextual
features (objection 4). Pinto’s last objection (6) is that whatever inferential principle or rule we
follow must be one that we later cite or invoke as a warrant. This, I think, captures something
vital about what we mean by a reason, and is especially important for our theory of argument as
reasoned change in view. Yet, what seems even more important is what Pinto does not object to
in Peirce’s theory. Pinto is not only willing to retain the view that inferences are mental
phenomena and inferential relations describe a “causal transition from belief in premises to belief
in a conclusion” (1995a, 282), but he does not seem to object to the view that the principles of
inference, functioning as principles of evidence and justification, remain (ultimately grounded
in) “habits of mind.” Yet, do habits of mind make for good warrants? Can evidentiary relations
be grounded in mental habits?
5

These reasons are, roughly, as follows (Pinto 1995a, 280-282):
(1) Inference does not always result in the acquisition of a new belief (one might surrender a belief);
(2) Inference does not always result in the acquisition of a new belief (it result in a resolution to act in a
certain way);
(3) Cases of hypothetical reasoning do not seem adequately captured on this model (inferences may occur
in cases where belief is not at issue);
(4) The “habit of mind” account, by ignoring contextual factors, is oversimplified because “which
conclusions I actually draw depends not only on the ‘guiding principles’ that govern my thought, but
also on my current interests, etc.” (281);
(5) Some (legitimate) inferences may not be put into the form of a general, rule-governed pattern.
(6) That the rule on which the inference proceeds serve properly as a reason or warrant in the sense that
the actor be able to cite the rule of inference in her account of her belief. (There are no unconscious
inferences.)
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4. Inference and Implication
Now, with the Foundational Question again in mind, let us consider another set of rules that
have been supplied as the rules of inference. Here I mean the rules of implication provided by
Formal Deductive Logic (FDL). Kneale and Kneale open their Development of Logic (1962)
saying “Logic is concerned with the principles of valid inference” (1). On this picture, the
subject matter of logic is inference, and, since arguments contain inferences, the link between
logic and argument is assured by its very subject matter. A good inference has the same
structure as some formally valid argument. The rules of inference just are the rules of
implication. Now, I am quite aware that, for the most part, FDL is not longer held to provide a
good model of argument. But, before we consider the reasons for which it was abandoned as a
theory of argument appraisal, let us consider what the FDL model afforded us. Why was FDL
such an attractive model for argument?
To see the answer to this, consider what Frege wrote about the laws of logic in his 1918
essay “The Thought” (or “Judgeable Contents”). “In order to avoid any misunderstanding,” he
wrote, “and prevent the blurring of the boundary between psychology and logic, I assign to logic
the task of discovering the laws of truth, not the laws of taking things to be true or of thinking.
The meaning of the word ‘true’ is spelled out in the laws of truth [i.e., logic].” So, the subject
matter of logic is truth, or at least, those relationships among propositions that are truth
preserving or truth guaranteeing. Moreover, there is an intrinsic, analytic relationship between
logical laws and the truth.
Such a picture affords Argumentation Theory remarkable dividends. In the first place, both
Johnson and Pinto wish to retain a picture on which argument is concerned, at a fundamental
level, with ascertaining the truth. Johnson, who defines argument as the product of the practice
of argumentation, claims that the “fundamental purpose ... [of the practice of argumentation] is to
arrive at the truth about some issue” (158; viz. 25). Pinto, on the other hand, recommends
modifying our earlier picture of inference to include the view that “inferences are good or bad
depending [in part] on whether the patterns are truth-preserving” (282).6 So, if the logical laws
are the laws of truth, and the subject matter of logic is inference, then, on Frege’ account, we
have an ideal foundation for our Theory of Appraisal. The foundations for the norms of good
argument are securely moored to the truth and, as such, seem able to properly capture evidentiary
relations.
How, though, does this picture answer Connection Question? Frege recognized the
following distinction: “an explanation of a mental process that ends in taking something to be
true can never take the place of proving what is taken to be true.” Yet, the traditional picture of
inference aptly bridges this gap. “From the laws of truth,” Frege writes, “there follow certain
prescriptions about asserting, thinking, judging, [and] inferring.” In this way, inference remains
the subject matter of both the Theory of Appraisal and the theory of Analysis.
Why was this picture rejected by argumentation theorists? Many of the standard objections
to FDL as the model of Argument Appraisal are again rooted in the basic objection that the
standards of FDL are not comprehensive. Obviously, no logic can supply normative criteria for
the truth or acceptability of individual contingent claims. Nor, as Pinto notes (1995a, fn 14), can
6

Admittedly, this is only one of six corrective recommendations Pinto makes (1995a, 282-83).

On The Relation Of Argumentation And Inference

6

FDL provide an account of semantic entailment. Moreover, Johnson objects that FDL cannot
accommodate a spectrum view whereby (a) claims have varying degrees of acceptability and (b)
there are (or may be) good arguments both for and against a certain view (2000). Also, the
Premise + Inference model of argument does not seem well-suited to capture any Dialectical Tier
which, Johnson argues, forms a necessary component of any theory of argument. Finally, Pinto
writes that “entailment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the premises and
conclusion of an argument or inference being suitably linked. Not sufficient, because an
argument of the form ‘P therefore P’ meets the criterion of entailment but is hopeless as an
argument. Not necessary because there are innumerable inductively strong arguments in which
premisses do not entail conclusions” (1995a, 277). On the grounds of these kinds of objections,
formalism was abandoned as a Theory of Argument Appraisal.
5. The Problems for Informal Accounts
In the place of formalist criteria, Argumentation Theorists sought to divine a set of
normative standards which could inform a Theory of Appraisal, while at the same time doing
justice to the situated nature of argumentation—that is, to ensure that the Theory of Appraisal
was suitably relevant to the subject matter of the Theory of Analysis, namely, reasoned change in
view. Informalists supplied the criteria of Relevance, Sufficiency and Acceptability, and some
(Johnson, and, it would seem, Pinto) have retained the criterion of truth. Yet, some of the
problems facing the traditional picture remain.
In the first place, the link between the standards informing the Theory of Appraisal and truth
must be established. Theorists no longer have the luxury afforded by Frege’s stipulation that the
laws of good inference just are the ‘laws of truth,’ and that, by studying good inferences we are,
in fact, studying truth relations. Moreover, to the degree to which the causal elements of the
traditional picture of inference are challenged, theorists may no longer claim the dividend
whereby evidentiary relations, being inferential relations, have inherent doxastic force. These
were the things that the traditional picture of inference afforded Argumentation Theory.
What we have seen to this point is that the inferential model of argument provided desirable,
if unsustainable, answers to the Connection Question and the Foundation Question with which I
began this paper. Moreover, it seems that whatever model Informalists like Johnson and Pinto
wish to advance, some of the features of the traditional picture I have described (above) remain.
One of these remaining features, I claim, is a picture of rationality whereby we find claims
acceptable on the basis of reasons—that is, on the basis of relations between claims that are not
merely psychological but also evidentiary. The reasons supplied in an argument are the reasons
on the basis of which we not only come to accept a conclusion, revise a belief, or come to a
reasoned change in view, but also on the basis of which we justify that change in view. These
reasons, then, constitute (the relevant part of) the subject matter for our Theory of Analysis and
our Theory of Appraisal. In the remainder of this paper, I challenge two consequences of this
picture of rationality, and in doing so, I question the relationship between the subject matter of
the Theory of Analysis and the Theory of Appraisal.
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6. Russell’s “Regressive Method”
I take it that one of the consequences of this picture of rationality is that, while it may not be
a comprehensive account of all good argument, deductivism, nevertheless, remains a good model
for some (kinds of) arguments. That is, some good arguments are deductive ones, supplying
reasons on the basis of which their conclusions are accepted and acceptable. Just what those
kinds of arguments are might be a matter of debate, but one likely candidate seems to be
arguments whose subject matter is mathematical.
Bertrand Russell challenged this picture in his 1907 paper “The Regressive Method.” What
Russell, questioned in this paper was the relationship between the logical justification of a
proposition and the reasons we have not only for coming to believe that proposition but for
holding the proposition itself to be true. “There is an apparent absurdity,” Russell wrote, “in
proceeding, as one does in the logical theory of arithmetic, through the rather recondite
propositions of symbolic logic, to the ‘proof’ of such truisms as 2 + 2 = 4: for it is plain that the
conclusion is more certain than the premises, and the supposed proof therefore seems futile.”
Several aspects of the traditional picture are here challenged.
In the first place, Russell challenged the traditional logicist assumption, articulated by
Frege’s assertion that the laws of logic are the laws of truth. This challenge comes out in
Russell’s construal of the nature of a proof: “But of course,” Russell wrote, “what we are really
proving is not the truth of 2 + 2 = 4, but the fact that from our premises this truth can be
deduced.” Yet, once the notion of truth is severed from the notion of proof, questions about the
relation of evidence quickly follow. That is, insofar as argument is fundamentally concerned
with truth, is not the evidence supplied in support of a claim meant to establish its truth?
Moreover, I take Russell, here, to be doing more than simply challenging a formalist account
of evidentiary relations. Rather, I see him as challenging the picture whereby those claims that
bear a strictly evidentiary relationship to some claim do not necessarily have doxastic force, and
thereby need not effect our acceptance or retention of a claim. Russell went on to recognise two
kinds of premises. He wrote: “...the word ‘premise’ has two quite different senses: there is what
we may call the ‘empirical premise’, which is the proposition or propositions from which we are
actually led to believe the proposition in question; and there is what we call the ‘logical premise’,
which is some logically simpler proposition or propositions from which, by a valid deduction,
the proposition in question can be obtained.” The question then arises: given that we can
provide a deductive justification for certain claims by offering their logical premises, and given
that these premises and their evidentiary relations to the conclusion are the subject matter of
some Theory of Appraisal, is that theory relevant to our actual reasons for accepting the
conclusions.7
Irvine, in his (1989) commentary on Russell’s regressive view, supplied three reasons to
support the claim that any criticism based on the logical premises may not be relevant to our
acceptance of the claim based on the empirical premises:
(1) “consider an elementary arithmetical proposition such as ‘2 + 2 = 4’. ...Not everyone
who knows such elementary propositions to be true, if pressed, could come up with a
7

While I am cognizant of the fact that the logicist project strictly failed at the hand of “the contradiction,” I
suggest that the criticism remains a relevant one in cases where a deductive proof may be offered.
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satisfactory sequence of sentences which would constitute the required proof. In
fact, most people who know many elementary arithmetical truths could not even
truthfully claim to have ever seen such a proof, let alone being able to reproduce one
as a warrant for their belief.” (308)
(2) “Most of us would continue to feel justified in our beliefs despite our inability to
provide the requisite justification by way of a logical proof.” (ibid)
(3) “It is much more likely that an error has been made in the proof than that 2 + 2 does
not equal 4. It follows that our knowledge of such basic arithmetical beliefs comes
from some means other than mathematical proof.” (ibid)
While these reasons seem compelling, the consequences of Russell’s position in the
“Regressive Method” are distressing. Irvine proceeds to note two crucial consequences of the
view of the Regressive Method:
(4) “Since we accept general axioms on the basis of our ability to derive from
them particular propositions, the truth of which is already and independently
known, “[t]he result is that even the most fundamental of logical laws may
remain merely probable” (313).
(5) “A logical foundation for a branch of mathematics is not literally a
foundation in the sense of attempting to establishing once and for all the truth
of all mathematical propositions. Rather, the role of foundational work in
mathematics is comparable to that in the natural sciences. In short, logical
foundations do their work by explaining rather than proving the truths of
mathematics” (318).
In fact, then, the final consequence of Russell’s challenge is the complete reversal of the
traditional epistemic relationship between the premises and the conclusion of an argument.
Russell supposed, or hypothesised, that, in many cases the two kinds of premises would coincide,
stating “...the empirical premise and the proximate logical premise will generally coincide. Thus
in mathematics, except in the earliest parts, the propositions from which a given proposition is
deduced generally give the reason why we believe the proposition. But in dealing with the
principles of mathematics, this relation is reversed .... [In this latter case] we tend to believe the
premises because we see that their consequences are true, instead of believing the consequences
because we know the premises to be true.” The question that remains for Argumentation Theory
is what is the subject matter of our study: empirical premises, or logical ones? And what is their
relationship? In studying the logical ones, we may be capturing the properly evidentiary relations
that seek to account for certainty in mathematics. But this may be completely independent of
why, and for what reasons we accept basic mathematical claims as true. On the other hand, in
studying the empirical ones, we may actually be able to study reasoned change in view, in its
causal sense, but this may, similarly, occur independently of those principles that actually serve
as evidence either for the claim. The traditional picture of inference preserved the picture that, in
studying the logical premises we were studying the empirical premises and vice versa. This
created a happy union between the descriptive-analytic and normative-evaluative components of
Argumentation Theory. Yet, as we have seen, substantiation for this union may be wanting.
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7. Harman’s Theories of Justification
A second aspect of the traditional picture that remains in the revised, Informalist account is
the Sufficiency element of the R.S.A. (+ truth) criterion. Good reasons must provide sufficient
evidence on the basis of which claims are acceptable or accepted. This criterion of sufficiency
allows that there may be other sets of sufficient reasons for some claim, and, as such, a particular
set of reasons might not be necessary. But, does it follow that no particular set of reasons is
necessary? That is, it would seem that something stronger than mere sufficiency is required.
Would the theorist not want to maintain that some set of good reasons is necessary for the
acceptability of a claim? While the theorist might wish to reserve a theoretical space for basic
(or self-evident) claims, Gilbert Harman observes a problem that appears when the reasons for
some claim are discredited and no other reasons in support of the claim are provided.
In Change in View (1986) Harman examines the relationship between justification and belief
revision, considering two theories of justification: the foundations theory and the coherence
theory. As a theory of justification, each theory serves as a model of ideal belief revision. In
distinguishing the two theories, Harman writes: “[t]he key issue is whether one needs to keep
track of one’s original justifications for beliefs” (29), foundationalists say “yes” and coherentists
say “no.” Thus, Harman writes, “the theories are most easily distinguished by the conflicting
advice they occasionally give concerning whether one should give up a belief P ... when P s
original justification has to be abandoned” (30). On the foundational view: “one is justified in
continuing to believe something only if one has a special reason to continue to accept that belief,
whereas the coherence theory says one is justified in continuing to believe something as long as
one has no special reason to stop believing it” (32). It would seem that the elements of the
inferentialist picture retained by both Johnson and Pinto, whereby a claim is only acceptable “on
the basis” of the reasons supplied in argument, is committed to something like the
foundationalist picture of rationality (Johnson s definition of rational persuasion, op cite).
But, Harman observes, when we consider actual cases of belief perseverance in the face of
“the total destruction of their original evidential basis” it becomes clear that there are problems
with the foundationalist theory. It is found that people retain beliefs even after the positive
refutation of all the evidence that was provided in original support of the belief. To account for
this phenomenon, Harman suggests that, possibly for reasons of mental clutter avoidance (4142), “people simply do not keep track of the justification relations among their beliefs. They
continue to believe things after the evidence for them has been discredited because they do not
realize what they are doing. They do not understand that the discredited evidence was the sole
reason why they believe as they do” (38). Yet, if this is the case, then it seems that the
foundational theory fails. In fact, Harman observes, “since people rarely keep track of their
reasons, the [foundational] theory implies that people are unjustified in almost all their beliefs.
This is an absurd result” (39). Harman’s critique not only challenges the causal elements of the
traditional picture whereby beliefs are established on the basis of the reasons supplied in
argument, but it challenges the very picture of rationality on which Argumentation Theory may
depend. That is to say, if we agree with Russell that it is not the logical premises on which we
come to reasoned change in view, and with Harman we conclude that it may yet not be the
empirical premises either, then what options remain?
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